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Competition and respect of social economy identity in Italian social cooperatives

Thematic area: 
4.3 Competition and respect of social economy identity
Language: 
English
State: 
Needs work
Name(s) of author(s): 
Angelo Gasparre
Name(s) of author(s): 
Andrea Bernardoni
Affiliation(s) of author(s): 
University of Genoa
Affiliation(s) of author(s): 
Legacoop
Company / Organisation: 
Faculty of Economics, University of Genoa
Address: 
Via Vivaldi, 5
Postalcode: 
16126
City: 
Genoa, Italy

Italian social cooperatives have been experiencing a leading developing process within country’s social economy during the last two decades (Thomas, 2004).

Coming from an history of small and medium scale activity scope, intensely shared values and recognized identity (Barbetta, 1993; Pezzini, 1997), these organizations display now significant economic features (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001) and – after a long period of public preferential purchasing and other external advantages which have been playing a key role in their growth (Rossi, 1996) – they now operates in more and more open m

Contact phone: 
+390102095579; +393478409871
Contact e-mail: 
gasparre@economia.unige.it

Cooperative Legislation´s Role in Cooperative Survival: Balancing Integration, Flexibility and Differentiation

Thematic area: 
4.3 Competition and respect of social economy identity
Language: 
English
State: 
Optional
Name(s) of author(s): 
Carlos Vargas-Vasserot
Name(s) of author(s): 
Cynthia Giagnocavo
Affiliation(s) of author(s): 
Faculty of Law, University of Almeria
Affiliation(s) of author(s): 
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University of Almeria
Company / Organisation: 
University of Almeria
Address: 
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Room 2.29, La Cañada
Postalcode: 
04120
City: 
Almeria, Spain

Cooperative Legislation´s Role in Cooperative Survival: Balancing Integration, Flexibility and Differentiation

Carlos Vargas-Vasserot, Associate Professor of Commercial Law, University of Almeria, Spain and Cynthia Giagnocavo, Ph.D.

Contact phone: 
+34 950 015174
Contact e-mail: 
cgiagnocavo@cajamar.es

PRIVILEGED TAX ADVANTAGE OF COOPERATIVES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: REASONS AND WRONGS ABOUT ITS QUESTIONING

Thematic area: 
4.3 Competition and respect of social economy identity
Language: 
English
State: 
Publish
Name(s) of author(s): 
Dr. Juan José Hinojosa Torralvo
Name(s) of author(s): 
Dr. Marina Aguilar Rubio
Affiliation(s) of author(s): 
Profesor ox Tax Law, University of Málaga (Spain)
Affiliation(s) of author(s): 
Lecturer in Tax Law, University of Almería (Spain)
Company / Organisation: 
Universidad de Almería (Facultad de Derecho)
Address: 
Carrera de Sacramento s/n
Postalcode: 
04120
City: 
Almería (Spain)

The laws of some EU Member States (particularly Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain) have a more favorable taxation for some or all cooperatives than the limited liability companies. The existence of a privileged tax regime has been traditionally associated with the singular nature of capital and profit cooperative.

Contact phone: 
0034 950015204 (office) 0034 635689179 (movile)
Contact e-mail: 
magui@ual.es

Trustworthiness and Competition

Thematic area: 
2. The Social Economy and Social capital
Language: 
English
State: 
Needs work
Name(s) of author(s): 
Sergio Beraldo
Name(s) of author(s): 
Gilberto Turati
Affiliation(s) of author(s): 
University of Naples
Affiliation(s) of author(s): 
University of Turin
Company / Organisation: 
Dipartimento di Scienze dello Stato, University of Naples "Federico II"
Address: 
via Mezzocannone 4
Postalcode: 
80134
City: 
Napoli (Italy)

Recent experimental studies argue that competition yields higher levels of buyer trust and seller trustworthiness, with this having obvious desirable consequences on market efficiency. The setting analysed in these studies basically resembles the classical trust game, with the first mover (the buyer) deciding whether to purchase an item, and the second mover (the seller) deciding whether to cheat (by providing a good of a quality different from the one promised or by not shipping the good).

Contact phone: 
081 25 34 060
Contact e-mail: 
s.beraldo@unina.it
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